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Delegated Interstate War: Introducing an Addition to Armed
Conflict Typologies
Abstract
Drawing the dividing line between civil and interstate war can be a difficult task. This task
is made even more difficult by a gap in the current typology of armed conflict. The conflict
studies literature in general and the coding rules of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in
particular acknowledge that internal conflict can involve external actors but ignore that
interstate conflict can be disguised as internal rebellion. This creates an unnecessary risk
of categorization errors and a risk of neglecting the potential complexity of interstate
conflict in the modern world. This article uses Idean Salehyan's distinction between
intervention and delegation, the Nicaragua Judgement of the International Court of Justice,
and the debate on the causes of the war in eastern Ukraine to illustrate this point. On the
basis of this discussion, it proposes the introduction of a new category – delegated
interstate conflict – to create a more coherent and symmetrical typology.
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Introduction
Civil war overshadows interstate war in the modern world in terms of
both frequency and destructiveness. According to the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP)–currently the world’s most comprehensive and
elaborate academic database of post-World War II organized violence–
interstate conflicts have constituted only a tiny fraction of all statebased armed conflicts recorded since 1946.1 On average, the UCDP
recorded fewer than two interstate conflicts per year, compared to
about 29 internal conflicts. Moreover, since 1989, interstate conflict
has resulted in an estimate of just over 130,000 combat-related deaths
compared to around 1,200,000 combat-related fatalities in internal
conflicts.2
The conflict studies literature has only relatively recently reacted to the
dominance of internal conflict that the UDCP data illustrates. Lars-Erik
Cederman and Manuel Vogt argue in their review of the academic
literature on civil war “most scholarship using ‘civil war’ as a
conceptual category appeared during the past one and a half decades.”3
This is in line with Stathis Kalyvas’ assessment, who, about ten years
earlier, argued “civil war has attracted considerable scholarly attention
from various disciplines–though considerably less than interstate
war.”4 Nevertheless, Kalyvas already observed “a recent boom in civil
war studies,” which was “fueled by the global shift from interstate to
intrastate conflict.”5
A shift of research focus toward civil war is an important adjustment to
the empirical reality. However, this does not mean that academics
should treat interstate conflict as a relic of the past–as something
inherently more straightforward and archaic than internal conflict.
This article argues the current conflict studies literature, and especially
the UCDP’s typology of armed conflict, is in danger of overshooting the
mark. The conflict studies literature and the UCDP underestimate the
complexity of interstate conflict and the potential blurriness of the
dividing line between the two types.
The argument proceeds in five steps. Firstly, the conflict studies
literature has paid insufficient attention to the distinction between
third-party intervention and third-party delegation in armed conflicts.
Secondly, this lack of attention manifests itself in the UCDP’s three-way
typology of armed conflict. Thirdly, the introduction of a new category–
delegated interstate conflict–can mitigate the risk of neglecting the
90
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 4

potential complexity of interstate war in the modern world. Fourthly,
the academic debate on the categorization of the conflict in eastern
Ukraine’s Donbas region illustrates the usefulness of this new category.
Finally, the introduction of delegated interstate conflict should go hand
in hand with a new research agenda focusing on forensic case-study
research of armed conflict.

Intervention versus Delegation
This article builds on Idean Salehyan’s criticism of the conflict studies
literature’s disregard for indirect interstate conflict strategies.
According to Salehyan, foreign governments often support rebel
organizations “as a substitute for the direct use of force” when states
want to avoid engaging their own armies in “costly military
campaigns.”6 Excluding such cases of conflict delegation from studies
of interstate violence “can lead empirical analyses to significantly
inflate the amount of peace in the international system.”7
Salehyan distinguishes delegation from intervention. Intervention, he
argues, “suggests that the civil war has domestic roots; foreign
governments are tangential to the onset of the war and become
involved once fighting is underway.”8 The foreign state has “little direct
control or influence over war aims and strategies.”9 Rebel forces
“preserve their organizational autonomy.”10 Delegation, on the other
hand, “indicates that external actors play an important role in shaping
the insurgency” and “are critical to the organization’s viability and
structure.”11 At the same time, “delegation requires some degree of
agenda control over agents–patrons influence the aims, strategies, and
tactics of the rebel group.”12
This distinction is missing from the literature on proxy or surrogate
warfare–terms, which are widely used to describe a variety of thirdparty involvement in armed conflicts. Alex Marshall, for example,
argues that both interstate wars, such as Cuba’s 1975 operation in
Angola, and civil wars, such as the ongoing war in Syria, qualify as
proxy or surrogate wars if conflict parties receive foreign support.13
Vladimir Rauta uses the term proxy war to describe what Salehyan
defines as intervention, while Anthony Vinci speaks of proxies to
describe what Salehyan defines as delegation.14 In addition, Amos Fox’s
proposed theory of proxy/surrogate warfare encompasses both
intervention and delegation.15
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International law, however, draws a dividing line between internal and
interstate conflict that is similar to Salehyan’s distinction between
intervention and delegation. It distinguishes between support for rebel
forces on the one hand and effective control over them on the other. A
1986 landmark decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)–the
judgement in the case Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua–assesses this topic in detail. The Court argued that
the scale of support that the United States provided to Nicaraguan
rebel forces was not sufficient to conclude that all of the rebels’ actions
were actions of the United States under international law.16 At the same
time, the Court outlined the criteria, which this particular case failed to
meet. The Court said that it had had to determine whether the
relationship between the United States and the rebels “was so much
one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it
would be right to equate the contras [rebels], for legal purposes, with
an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of
that Government.”17
This article proposes merging Salehyan’s concepts of intervention and
delegation with this legal principle of effective control to create
definitions that are more precise. According to these definitions,
delegation occurs if a foreign state controls a rebel force to a degree
comparable to a state organ. Foreign support that falls below this
threshold is intervention.
Drawing the dividing line between civil and interstate war according to
these criteria remains a challenging task. Salehyan acknowledges that
distinguishing between intervention and delegation can be difficult in
practice, because the foreign state may lose control over rebels that it
used for delegation, or increase control over rebels after engaging in
intervention.18 Moreover, the ICJ notes that the facts of the Nicaragua
case were difficult to establish because of the secretive nature of the
operations in question–a problem that probably applies to most cases
of foreign powers interacting with rebels.19
These difficulties are, perhaps, the reason why subsequent studies on
foreign sponsorship of rebel forces have not acted on Salehyan’s
suggestion to distinguish between intervention and delegation. Neither
do they pay attention to the differentiation between support and
effective control in international law. Instead, they keep these concepts
merged within a single variable, which they use for their research on
civil war. Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham
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investigate which factors determine whether rebel groups receive
foreign support.20 Matthew Moore shows that the transfer of arms to
rebels from external sources prolongs civil wars and increases their
deadliness.21 Salehyan, David Siroky, and Reed Wood argue that
foreign sponsorship of rebel forces increases the likelihood of crimes
against civilians.22 Bryce Reeder finds that foreign interference in civil
wars is an important factor that increases the risk or the severity of
subsequent interstate conflict.23 Henning Tamm investigates under
what conditions foreign sponsorship increases or decreases internal
cohesion of rebel groups.24 Milos Popovic finds that rebel forces
without a centralized organizational structure are more difficult to
control than centralized ones.25 He also finds that foreign sponsorship
increases the chances of alliance formation between different rebel
groups.26 Ryan Grauer and Dominic Tierney argue that the overall
likelihood of rebel forces receiving foreign support has increased over
time.27 In addition, Thomas Waldman analyzes the “strategic
narratives” which the United States uses to justify its support of rebel
forces.28 All of these works address important issues. None of them,
however, questions if what it is researching still qualifies as civil war.
On the contrary, all of them imply that all forms of foreign involvement
blur the boundary between civil and interstate war in the same way–by
introducing an interstate element into a civil war.

The UCDP’s Three-Way Typology
The UCDP follows the same logic by dividing civil war into two separate
categories: Internal armed conflict and internationalized internal
armed conflict. Conflicts of the latter category feature intervention
from other states. In conflicts of the former category, no such
intervention takes place.29 In light of the above definitions of
intervention and delegation, this subdivision of the civil war category
raises two questions. Firstly, the UCDP defines intervention from other
states in terms of “active troop participation.”30 What this means is that
the UCDP would categorize an internal conflict featuring a brief,
insignificant presence of foreign troops as internationalized. At the
same time, it would categorize a conflict, in which one side relies on
foreign funding, training, or arms instead of troops as purely internal.
Secondly, and more importantly, there is no analogous subdivision of
interstate conflict. There is no mention of the possibility that interstate
conflict may assume forms different from the open clash of two states’
regular armed forces. Just like the wider conflict studies literature, the
UCDP does not differentiate between intervention and delegation but
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places both forms of foreign involvement in the internationalized
internal conflict category.
On first sight, this category may appear as the middle ground between
an interstate conflict and a purely internal conflict. However, this is a
flawed perception. An internationalized internal conflict is always
closer to a purely internal conflict than to an interstate conflict. The
UCDP’s definition of the internationalized internal conflict category
specifies a clear hierarchy between the internal and the international
dimension. The rebels are always the primary conflict party and the
foreign state is always the secondary party providing support.31
Essentially, this is a definition of intervention rather than delegation.
Consequently, the dichotomous civil-interstate war typology, which still
dominates academic research and the wider political and legal
discourse, will define all internationalized internal conflicts as civil
wars rather than as something in between civil and interstate war.
The UCDP’s typology reflects the fact that foreign involvement in civil
wars is a widely acknowledged phenomenon in both academia and
politics. However, it also reflects a lack of awareness of how important
the difference between intervention and delegation actually is. An
attack by undercover Special Forces or mercenaries of a foreign state is
not the same as a local insurrection that receives foreign support. The
former scenario is more similar to an interstate war than to the latter
scenario. Vice versa, the latter scenario is more similar to a civil war
than to the former scenario. Each scenario requires different policy
responses and different approaches to conflict resolution.
What is more, even if a researcher is aware of the possibility that
interstate violence may occur in a covert, delegated way, the current
typology simply does not offer a way to reflect this. The current threeway typology categorizes cases that do not resemble the classical
interstate war scenario of one country openly attacking another with
regular armed forces almost always as internationalized internal
conflicts. This means that the current typology essentially categorizes
such conflicts as civil wars, which they are not. Therefore, ignoring the
difference between intervention and delegation increases the risk of
categorization errors, which may lead to flawed academic comparisons
and flawed policies.
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Introducing Delegated Interstate Conflict
A better alternative would be the creation of delegated interstate
conflict as a new subcategory of interstate conflict. This category would
include conflicts in which one state engages in armed combat on the
territory of another state via irregular militias, which the foreign state
controls to such an extent that they effectively act as a state organ.
Using this category would create a more symmetrical typology,
consisting of interstate, delegated interstate, internationalized internal,
and internal armed conflict. This typology would allow comparison
according to the civil war-interstate war dichotomy as well as the
exclusion and separate study of the mixed categories in between. At the
same time, it would increase transparency and reduce the risk of
classification errors. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed typology through
a simple 2x2 matrix. It is similar to a typology matrix by Simeon
Nichter, which David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright use as
an example in their “template for the rigorous construction of
typologies.”32
Figure 1: Categories of State-Based Armed Conflict
Is a foreign state participating indirectly–either as a secondary conflict party supporting a
primary conflict party or as a primary conflict party controlling a secondary conflict party?

Pure conflict: foreign support or
control absent

Is one of the
primary
conflict parties
a rebel group?

Civil war:
rebel group
present

Interstate
war: rebel
group absent

Mixed conflict: foreign
support or control present

Internal

Internationalized internal

Interstate

Delegated interstate

Source: Author

Estimating the frequency of delegated interstate conflict would require
a thorough review of cases that the UCDP currently classifies as
internal and internal internationalized. It is unlikely that such a review
would find that the prevalence of non-interstate conflict since the end
of World War II is due to a large number of wrongly categorized
delegated interstate conflicts. However, even a change in the
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categorization of a small number of cases could have an impact on the
findings of comparative research on interstate war, because this type of
war has become such a rare occurrence. In any case and regardless of
its frequency, delegated interstate war is more than just a theoretical
possibility. An important illustration of this is the conflict in eastern
Ukraine’s Donbas region.

The Case of the Donbas Conflict
The Ukrainian authorities have portrayed the conflict in the Donbas as
a Russian act of aggression from its beginning. On 13 April 2014,
Ukraine’s then Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov announced that
his administration had initiated a military operation in the east of the
country. He said this decision had been made after “terrorist units
coordinated by the Russian Federation” occupied police stations in the
towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.33 Ever since, Kyiv’s line has
remained the same: Ukraine is defending itself against Russia, which
attacked Ukraine’s southeast using special service units supported by
local mercenaries, before intervening with its regular armed forces.
Current Ukrainian legislation accuses Russia of armed aggression and
labels eastern Ukraine’s self-proclaimed separatist republics a “Russian
occupation administration.”34 The Russian authorities, on the other
hand, have consistently denied any involvement in the conflict beyond
humanitarian aid for suffering civilians and the presence of some
volunteers with Russian citizenship among the separatist forces.
According to Moscow, the conflict is an internal Ukrainian problem.
Russia is an arbiter in the peace process but by no means a conflict
party.35
The nascent academic debate on the nature and causes of the Donbas
conflict is not as polarized as the positions of Kyiv and Moscow. Most
scholars accept that an interplay between domestic and foreign factors
characterizes the conflict. However, when it comes to the relative
importance of these factors, the academic debate shows a divide that is
similar to the divide in the political discourse. One group of scholars
argues for the primacy of interstate factors, while another group argues
that internal factors are dominant. Nikolay Mitrokhin locates the
primary causes of the conflict in Moscow. He portrays the escalation of
violence as a targeted military operation and argues that Russia
gradually intensified its military engagement in Ukraine as its
destabilization efforts met increasing resistance from Kyiv.36 Andrew
Wilson also concludes “the war that began in 2014 was not a civil war
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with foreign intervention but a process catalyzed and escalated by local
elites and by Russia, with local foot-soldiers.”37 In addition, Mark
Galeotti emphasizes the role of Russia’s military intelligence service–
the GRU–in the Donbas.38 Serhiy Kudelia, on the other hand, argues,
“although many blame Moscow for starting the war in the region, the
key role was played by processes that took place within Ukraine.”39
Ivan Katchanovski claims “the predominant involvement of local
separatists at the start of the conflict […] points to the origins of this
conflict as a civil war.”40 Moreover, Richard Sakwa claims Moscow’s
“initial material support” for separatism in the Donbas “was greatly
exaggerated by the Kyiv government and its Western supporters.”41 The
UCDP’s current coding seems to be closer to this second group of
scholars. It categorizes the conflict in the Donbas as a group of three
internal conflicts between the Ukrainian Government and local
separatist forces. The UCDP acknowledges Russian support for these
forces by defining all of these internal conflicts as internationalized,
listing Russia as the secondary conflict party.42
Other scholars are likely to use this categorization not only for their
research but also for policy recommendations. Jesse Driscoll, for
example, argues in a recent policy memo that the UCDP “codes the
Ukraine conflict as a civil war.”43 He then suggests that policy makers
should accept this categorization to increase the chances of conflict
resolution in the Donbas. According to Driscoll, acknowledging that the
conflict is a civil war would allow the pursuit of an “elections first,
military drawdown later” approach as a more pragmatic strategy
towards peace.44 As Tymofii Brik points out, interpreting the conflict in
this way is problematic. According to Brik, Driscoll’s proposal takes
advantage of the UCDP typology’s ambiguity to justify disregard for the
interstate dimension of the Donbas conflict. Brik argues that the
UCDP’s definition of internationalized internal conflict “does not
include the word ‘civil war,’ yet one still could argue that this definition
describes civil wars in some generic way.”45 He claims that this is a
matter of personal interpretation, which Driscoll uses to justify a policy
proposal that carries the risk of letting Moscow “get away with
international crimes” and poses “a serious threat to peace-building in
Ukraine.”46 Brik’s assessment suggests that the current UCDP typology
lacks clarity regarding the different ways in which internal and
interstate factors can interact in a conflict like the one in Ukraine.
Adding delegated interstate war as a category would address this
shortcoming and could provide a basis for reassessing the conflict’s
categorization.
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Mitrokhin, Wilson, and Galeotti, who locate the conflict’s primary
causes in Moscow, go even further. Although they do not explicitly
consider the correct coding of the conflict in datasets, their
interpretation clearly suggests that the current categorization is
incorrect and that the UCDP should code the events as a single
interstate conflict. In turn, this would imply that conflict resolution has
to start in Moscow rather than in Kyiv. Interpreting events in the
Donbas in this way remains controversial. Just as controversial,
however, are the practical implications of the UCDP’s current
categorization of the conflict. According to the UCDP, the war in the
Donbas falls into the same category as, for example, the war in Syria
and Russia’s role in both conflicts is the same.

Challenges and Prospects
These academic controversies concerning the correct categorization of
the Donbas conflict support the observation by Salehyan and the ICJ
that differentiating between intervention and delegation can be a
challenging task. A state engaging in conflict delegation will usually
make efforts to maintain plausible deniability by covering its tracks,
which, in turn, makes it more difficult to establish the exact degree of
its involvement. For this reason, the introduction of delegated
interstate war should ideally go hand in hand with a new research
agenda, which takes a forensic, case study-based approach to studying
the origins of armed conflict. A promising methodological framework
for this purpose, which has so far received relatively little attention in
relation to the study of armed conflict, is process tracing.47 In cases of
older conflicts, process-tracing analysis could take advantage of
recently declassified documents or new eyewitness testimony. In cases
of recent or ongoing conflicts, it could make use of modern information
technology. The Internet and, in particular, the rise of social media has
given researchers access to conflict zones at an unprecedented scale. It
provides a large volume photo and video material as well as eyewitness
accounts that can be gathered, crosschecked, and analyzed. An
illustration of how this can work in practice is a recent investigation by
the Forensic Architecture research agency into Russia’s role in the 2014
Battle of Ilovaisk–a key turning point of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Forensic Architecture gathered, verified, and catalogued the openly
available evidence for Russian involvement in the battle and presented
it on an interactive online platform.48 Even though Russia tried to cover
its traces, footage of captured servicemen and destroyed tanks, Google
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Earth satellite imagery of military convoys, and eyewitness reports of
participants painted a concise picture of its role in the battle. Forensic
Architecture’s Ilovaisk project is only one example of how journalists
and activists have successfully used open source intelligence (OSINT)
analysis in the context of the Ukraine conflict. Academic research could
build on this work and use OSINT analysis as a basis for process tracing
to establish whether the Donbas conflict is a case of delegation or
intervention. Researchers could do the same for other conflicts that are
taking place in the age of modern information technology.
Naturally, certain limitations remain. Despite the potential of
declassified documents and OSINT analysis, gaps in the data are
inevitable in cases of covert military aggression. Moreover, there is the
problem of personal bias, which means that different researchers may
interpret the same data in different ways. However, researchers can
mitigate both of these problems to some extent. A recent study by
Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos and Jody LaPorte looks at steps that
process-tracing research can take to address the problem of missing
data.49 Bayesian logic, on the other hand, can reduce the problem of
bias by forcing researchers to make the probabilistic reasoning behind
their evaluation of evidence explicit.50
Finally, none of the challenges, opportunities, and limitations
discussed above is unique to the study of conflict delegation and
intervention. They are important topics of academic debate and
research both in the field of conflict studies and in the social sciences in
general. The introduction of delegated interstate war as a new conflict
category will draw attention to them and encourage researchers to
engage with them more broadly.

Conclusion
This article has argued that current armed conflict typologies run the
risk of underestimating the complexity of interstate conflict and its role
in the modern world. It has discussed the difference between thirdparty intervention and third-party delegation in armed conflicts, using
the work of Idean Salehyan and the Nicaragua Judgement of the ICJ. It
has then shown that current academic research fails to pay sufficient
attention to this differentiation. The UCDP’s armed conflict typology
both reflects and exacerbates this lack of attention. Based on this
discussion, this article has proposed the introduction of delegated
interstate conflict as a new subcategory of interstate conflict. This
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subcategory should include conflicts where one state engages in combat
on the territory of another state via irregular militias, which the foreign
state controls to such an extent that they effectively act as one of its
state organs.
This article has illustrated the usefulness of delegated interstate conflict
as a category by reviewing the academic controversy regarding the
categorization of the conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Some
scholars portray this conflict as a civil war with some degree of Russian
intervention, while others portray it as an invasion in disguise.
Currently, both of these hypotheses remain controversial and further
research on Russia’s role in the early stages of the Donbas conflict is
required. However, such research has to take into account that the
claim that the Donbas conflict is interstate does not rest on the
assumption that it is an open invasion of one country by another
country’s regular armed forces. It rests on the assumption that the case
of the Donbas in 2014 meets the criteria that the ICJ formulated in
1986. This would mean that eastern Ukraine’s separatist militias are
not an autonomous rebel force but, in fact, an organ of the Russian
state, waging a delegated war on the Kremlin’s behalf.
Because of the covert nature of both conflict delegation and
intervention, the difference between the two phenomena is difficult to
establish. However, this article has argued that researchers can address
this challenge through forensic case study research based on processtracing methodology. Combined with such an approach, a four-way
typology of armed conflict–consisting of interstate, delegated
interstate, internationalized internal, and internal–would improve
research on the causes of the Donbas conflict as well as policy
proposals resulting from this research. Research on various other past,
present, or future conflicts is likely to benefit in similar ways.
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